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Abstract—In this work we consider allocation games and we
investigate the following question: under what conditions does
the replicator dynamics select a pure strategy?
By deﬁnition, an allocation game is a game such that the
payoff of a player when she takes an action only depends on
the set of players who also take the same action. Such a game
can be seen as a set of users who share a set of resources, a
choice being an allocation to a resource.
A companion game (with modiﬁed utilities) is introduced.
From the payoffs of an allocation game, we deﬁne the reper-
cussion utilities: for each player, her repercussion utility is her
payoff minus the decrease in marginal payoff that her presence
causes to all other players. The corresponding allocation game
with repercussion utilities is the game whose payoffs are the
repercussion utilities. A simple characterization of those games
is given.
In such games, if the players select their strategy according
to a stochastic approximation of the replicator dynamics, we
show that it converges to a Nash equilibrium of the game
that is a locally optimal for the initial game. The proof is
based on the construction of a potential function for the game.
Furthermore, a spectral study of the dynamics shows that no
mixed equilibrium is stable, so that the strategies of all players
converge to a set of Nash equilibria. Then, martingale argument
prove the convergence of the stochastic approximation to a pure
point. A discussion of the global/local optimality of the limit
points is also included.
Keywords: allocation games; replicator dynamics; stochastic
approximation; pure Nash equilibrium.
I. INTRODUCTION
Deterministic evolutionary dynamics for games ﬁrst ap-
peared in the mathematical biology literature. Soon after,
it has found many applications in non-biological ﬁelds like
economics or learning theory in what is now called evolu-
tionary game theory, and classical texts emerged [1], [2].
In biology, the replicator dynamics was ﬁrst introduced by
Taylor and Jonker as an explicit dynamics that models the
evolution of species. In economics, the replicator dynamics
is a way to describe the behavior of a large population
of agents who are randomly matched to play normal form
games. Nowadays, the evolutionary game theory has been
successfully applied to allocation and routing problems in
telecommunication systems [3], [4].
There is a connection between the Nash equilibria and
replicator dynamics of a game. Indeed, according to the folk
theorem of evolutionary games, Nash equilibria are station-
ary points of the dynamics and all stable stationary points
are Nash equilibria. A central question for normal form game
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with multiple Nash equilibria is to know which of them will
be selected. In some cases, replicator dynamics converges
to a Nash equilibrium, but, unfortunately, it is known that
for the general “rock-scissors-paper” game, the replicator
dynamics may converge to a cycle and therefore does not
select any strategy. Hence, in general setting, the replicator
dynamics does not help one to select an equilibrium.
In this paper, we study mechanisms that select efﬁcient
Nash Equilibria for allocation games. Allocation games are
a generalization of congestion games [5]. The mechanism
we study here can be viewed as a stochastic approximation
of the replicator dynamics.
Some works have shown that asymmetric games with two
players admit no interior equilibrium stable for the replicator
dynamics [6], [7]. Purity of the equilibrium point is an
interesting property for many applications. Indeed, mixed
strategies may be costly for players as they amount to a
permanent change of choices [8]. Here, we provide a quite
general framework under which allocation games with an
arbitrary number of players and an arbitrary number of
choices converge to pure strategies. Furthermore, the limit
equilibrium point is also proved locally optimal.
Things work as follow: starting with an allocation game
(introduced in Section II-A), we deﬁne a companion game by
introducing the repercussion utilities (deﬁned in Section II-
B). For each player, the repercussion utility is deﬁned to
be her payoff in the original game minus the decrease in
marginal payoff that her presence causes to all other players.
We then give a useful characterization of those games.
Second, we study the replicator dynamics for the game
with repercussion utilities (Section III-A) and we show that
it admits a potential. Therefore, allocation games with reper-
cussion utilities, for which we have a simple characterization,
are a subclass of potential games [9], [10]. A classical
result claims that the potential is a Lyapunov function for
the replicator dynamics. We also show, by considering the
divergence of the replicator dynamics, that it does not admit
any stable equilibria in the interior of its domain (the cube in
dimension N). Combining these two ingredients, we show
that the stable points of the replicator dynamics for the
game with repercussion utilities are faces of the domain.
This induces the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium
in allocation games with repercussion utilities. Finally we
propose in Section III-B a distributed algorithm based on
a stochastic approximation of the replicator dynamics that
converges to a stable equilibrium of the replicator dynamics,
and, furthermore, to a pure Nash equilibrium of the allocationgame with repercussion utilities (see Theorem 2). As the
algorithm is stochastic, at each iteration and for each player,
only one possible action is tested and evaluated. This limits
the number of changes of actions, which can be attractive in
certain types of applications [8] and contrasts with classical
gradient-descent like algorithms [4].
The last part (Section IV) introduces a discussion on the
shape of the basin of attraction of the stable equilibria in
the case where the potential function admits several local
maxima. We show that with two players and two choices,
the center of the cube always belongs to the basin of
attraction of the globally maximal point. This insures that the
stochastic approximation algorithm converges to the optimal
equilibrium with a large probability when starting from the
center of the cube. However, with more players and/or more
choices, we exhibit several examples showing that starting
in the center may not lead to the globally optimal point.
II. ALLOCATION GAMES RELATED TO POTENTIAL
GAMES
A. Allocation Games
We consider a normal-form game (N;I;U) consisting of
a set N of players (jNj = N), player n taking actions in a
set In  S (jInj = In), where S is the set of all actions.
Let us denote by sn 2 In the action taken by player n, and
s = (sn)n2N 2 I =
NN
n=1 In. Then, U = (Un)n2N refers
to the utility or payoff for each player: the payoff for player
n is Un(s1;:::;sn;:::;sN).
By deﬁnition, an allocation game is a game such that the
payoff of a player when she takes action i only depends on
the set of players who also take action i. One can interpret
such a game as a set of users who share a common set
of resources S, and an action vector corresponds to an
allocation of resources to users (hence the name of these
games).
We deﬁne the load on action (or resource) i by `i(s) 2
f0;1gN as a vector such that `i
n(s) = 1 if and only if player
n take action i. When there is no ambiguity, we will simplify
the notation and use ` = `i(s). We denote by `sn(s) the load
on the action taken by player n, and we denote the payoff
for player n by un(`sn(s))
def = Un(s1;:::;sn;:::;sN).
Hence, allocations games are a wider class of games than
congestion games where the payoff of each player depends
on the number of players adopting the same strategy [5].
They represent systems where different users accessing a
given resource may have a different impact.
B. Repercussion utilities
We build a companion game of the allocation game,
denoted (N;I;R). The new player utilities, called reper-
cussion utilities are built from the payoffs of the
original game, according to the following deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 1 (allocation game with repercussion utilities):
Let us consider the repercussion utility for player n to be:
rn(`sn(s))
def = un(`sn(s)) 
X
m6=n:sm=sn
(um(`sm(s)   en)   um(`sm(s))):
where en denotes the vector whose entries are all 0 but the
nth one, which equals 1.
An allocation game with repercussion utilities is a game
whose payoffs are repercussion utilities.
The utilities deﬁned in this manner have a natural inter-
pretation: it corresponds to the player’s payoff (un(`sn(s)))
minus the total increase in payoff for all users impacted
by the presence of a given user on a given commodity
(
X
m6=n:
sm=sn
[um(`sm(s)   en)   um(`sm(s))]). This is more ob-
vious in the following equivalent formulation.
Remark 1: An equivalent formulation of the repercussion
utilities is:
rn(`sn(s))
=
X
m:`
sn
m =1
um(`sn(s))  
X
m6=n:
`
sn
m (s)=1
um(`sn(s)   en):
C. Characterization of Allocation Games with Repercussion
Utilities
We now give a characterization of a payoff which is a
repercussion utility.
Proposition 1: An allocation game (N;I;R) is an al-
location game with repercussion utilities if and only if
8`;8n;m 2 N s.t. sm = sn,
rn(`)   rn(`   em) = rm(`)   rm(`   en): (1)
Proof: Suppose that r is a repercussion utility, then there
exists a payoff u such that:
rn(`) =
X
`k=1
uk(`)  
X
k6=n:`k=1
(uk(`   en)):
Then, denote
A =
0
@
X
`k=1
uk(`   em)  
X
k6=n:`k=1
uk(`   en   em)
1
A:
Then,
rn(`)   rn(`   em)
=
X
`k=1
uk(`)  
X
k6=n:`k=1
uk(`   en)   A
=
X
`k=1
uk(`)  
X
k6=m:`k=1
uk(`   em)   A
= rm(`)   rm(`   en):
Conversely, consider an allocation game (N;I;R) such
that Eq. 1 is satisﬁed. Consider an action i and ` the vector ofload on action i. Then, ` 2 f0;1gN and K
def =
P
k:`k=1 1 is
the number of players taking action i. Further, let (a(k));1 
k  K be the subscripts of all players taking action i. If there
are K such players, then ` =
PK
k=1 ea(k). Then, we claim
that, for any permutation  of f1;Kg:
K 1 X
k=0
ra(k+1)(`  
k X
j=1
ea(j)) =
K 1 X
k=0
ra((k+1))(`  
k X
j=1
ea((j))): (2)
Indeed, note that, from Eq. 1:
ra(k+1)
0
@`  
k 1 X
j=1
ea(j)
1
A   ra(k+1)
0
@`  
k X
j=1
ea(j)
1
A =
ra(k)
0
@`  
k 1 X
j=1
ea(j)
1
A ra(k)
0
@`  
k 1 X
j=1
ea(j)   ea(k+1)
1
A:
Therefore:
ra(k)
0
@`  
k 1 X
j=1
ea(j)
1
A + ra(k+1)
0
@`  
k X
j=1
ea(j)
1
A =
ra(k+1)
0
@`  
k 1 X
j=1
ea(j)
1
A+ra(k)
0
@`  
k 1 X
j=1
ea(j)   ea(k+1)
1
A:
Hence, for any k, the sum
P
ra(k+1)(`  
Pk
j=1 ea(j)) re-
mains unchanged if one swaps a(k) and a(k+1) (elementary
transposition). Then, Eq. 2 results from the fact that any
permutation  can be decomposed in a ﬁnite number of
elementary transpositions.
We now construct a payoff u as follow: for any n such
that `n = 1, let us deﬁne:
un(`)
def =
1
K
K 1 X
k=0
ra(k+1)(`  
k X
j=1
ea(j)):
Then,
X
`m=1
um(`)  
X
m6=n:`m=1
(um(`   en)) =
K 1 X
k=0
ra(k+1)(` 
k X
j=1
ea(j)) 
K 2 X
k=0
rb(k+1)(` en 
k X
j=1
eb(j)):
Note that the sequence a is identical to sequence b with
the additional element n. From Eq. 2, we can choose a
permutation  such that a((1)) = n. Then:
X
`m=1
um(`)  
X
m6=n:`m=1
(um(`   en))
=
K 1 X
k=0
ra((k+1))(`  
k X
j=1
ea((j))) 
K 1 X
k=1
ra(((k+1))(`   en  
k X
j=2
ea((j)))
=
K 1 X
k=1
ra((k+1))(`   ea((1))  
k X
j=2
ea((j)))+
ra((1))(`)  
K 1 X
k=1
ra(((k+1))(`   en  
k X
j=2
ea((j)))
= rn(`):
Hence (N;I;R) is the allocation game with repercussion
utilities associated to the (N;I;U) allocation game.
From Prop. 1, we conclude that allocation games with
repercussion utilities are a special subset of allocation games.
The results presented in the following are hence valid for any
allocation game such that Eq. 1 is satisﬁed.
Example 1: Let M be the payoff matrix of a two-player
game. This amounts to saying that the ﬁrst (resp. second)
player chooses the line and the second chooses the column.
The payoff for the ﬁrst player is given by the ﬁrst (resp.
second) component.
M =

(a;A) (b;B)
(c;C) (d;D)

:
It follows from Proposition 1 that this is a game with
repercussion utilities if and only if a = A + b   C and
d = D+c B. Then, one can check the interesting property
that there necessarily exists a pure Nash equilibrium (for
instance (a;A) is a Nash equilibrium if a  c and A  B).
D. Allocation Games with Repercussion Utilities are Poten-
tial Games
In this section, we show that, given an allocation game,
the game with repercussion utilities (1) admits a potential
function and (2) this potential equals the sum of the payoffs
for all players in the initial game. This appealing property is
exploited in the next section to show some strong results on
the behavior of the well-known replicator dynamics on such
games.
Consider an allocation (N;I;U) and its companion game
(N;I;R). We ﬁrst assume that players have mixed strate-
gies. Hence a strategy for player n is a vector of probability
qn = (qn;i)i2In, where qn;i is the probability for player
n to take action i (i.e. qn;i = P(sn = i)  0 and P
i2In qn;i = 1). The strategy domain for player n is
n
def = f0  qn;i  1;s:t:
P
i2In qn;i = 1g Then, the
global domain is  =
QN
n=1 n and a global strategy is
q
def = (qn)n2N. We say that q is a pure strategy if for any n
and i, qn;i equals either 0 or 1.
We denote by S 2 I the random vector whose entries Sn
are all independent and whose distribution is 8n 2 N;8i 2
In; P(Sn = i) = qn;i. The expected payoff for player nwhen she takes action i is fn;i(q)
def = E[rn(`i(S))jSn = i].
Then, her mean payoff is fn(q)
def =
X
i2In
qn;ifn;i(q). We can
notice that fn;i(q) only depends on (qm;i)m6=n and it is a
multi-linear function of (qm;i)m6=n.
The next theorem claims that the allocation game with
repercussion utilities is a potential game. Potential games
were ﬁrst introduced in [9]. The notion was afterward
extended to continuous set of players [10]. In our case, it
refers to the fact that the expected payoff for each player
derives from a potential function. More precisely, here we
show that fn;i(q) =
@F
@qn;i
(q), where
F(q)
def =
X
n2N
X
i2In
qn;iE[un(`i(S))jSn = i]: (3)
It is interesting to notice the connection between fn;i(q)
which is the expected repercussion utility, and F(q) which
refers to the sum of expected payoffs in the initial game: if
a strategy increases the expected repercussion utility of a
player, then it increases the potential.
Theorem 1: The allocation game with repercussion utili-
ties is a potential game, and its associated potential function
is F, as deﬁned in Eq. 3.
Proof: Let us ﬁrst differentiate function F:
@F
@qn;i
(q) = E[un(`i(S))jSn = i]+
X
m6=n
qm;i
@E[um(`i(S))jSm = i]
@qn;i
:
In fact, it is clear that
@E[um(`j(S))jSm = j]
@qn;i
= 0 if j 6= i,
and
@E[un(`i(S))jSn = i]
@qn;i
= 0. To simplify the notations,
we omit the index i. Then,
@F
@qn
(q)
= E[un(`(S))jSn = i]+
X
m6=n
qm
@
@qn
X
`
um(`)P(`(S) = `jSm = i)
= E[un(`(S))jSn = i]+
X
m6=n
qm
X
`
um(`)

P(`(S) = `jSm = i;Sn = i) 
P(`(S) = `jSm = i;Sn 6= i)

= E[un(`(S))jSn = i] +
X
m6=n
qm
X
`
um(`)

P(`(S) = `;Sm = ijSn = i) 
P(`(S) = ` + en;Sm = ijSn = i)

= E[un(`(S))jSn = i] 
X
m6=n:
Sm=Sn

E[um(`(S)   en)jSn = i] 
E[um(`(S))jSn = i]

= E[rn(`(S))jSn = i]
= fn;i(q):
III. REPLICATOR DYNAMICS AND ALGORITHMS
In this section, we show how to design a strategy update
mechanism for all players in an allocation game with reper-
cussion utilities that converges to pure Nash Equilibria. We
will study in the next section (Section IV) their efﬁciency
properties.
A. Replicator Dynamics.
We now consider that the player strategies vary over time,
hence q depends on the time t: q = q(t). The trajectories
of the strategies are described below by a dynamics called
replicator dynamics. We will see in section III-B that this
dynamics can be seen as the limit of a learning mechanism.
Deﬁnition 2: The replicator dynamics [1][2] is (8n 2
N;i 2 In):
dqn;i
dt
(q) = qn;i
 
fn;i(q)   fn(q)

: (4)
We say that ^ q is a stationary point (or equilibrium point) if
(8n 2 N;i 2 In):
dqn;i
dt
(^ q) = 0:
In particular, ^ q is a stationary point implies 8n 2 N;i 2
In; ^ qn;i = 0 or fn;i(^ q) = fn(^ q).
Intuitively, this dynamics can be understood as an update
mechanism where the probability for each player to choose
actions whose expected payoffs are above average will
increase in time, while non proﬁtable actions will gradually
be abandoned.
Let us notice that the trajectories of the replicator dy-
namics remain inside the domain . Also, from [10], the
potential function F is a Lyapunov function for the replicator
dynamics, hence is strictly increasing along the trajectories
which are not stationary.
In this context, a closed set A is Lyapunov stable if, for
every neighborhood B, there exists a neighborhood B0  B
such that the trajectories remain in B for any initial condition
in B0. A is asymptotically stable if it is Lyapunov stable and
is an attractor (i.e. there exists a neighborhood C such that
all trajectories starting in C converge to A).Finally, let us recall the Lasalle principle [11] which states
that the existence of a (strictly increasing) Lyapunov function
implies that all the trajectories converge to connected sets of
equilibrium points.
Proposition 2: All the asymptotically stable sets of the
replicator dynamics are faces of the domain. These faces are
sets of equilibrium points for the replicator dynamics.
Proof: We show that any set which is not a face of the
domain is not an attractor. This results from a property
discovered by E. Akin [7] which states that the replicator
dynamics preserves a certain form of volume.
Let A be a asymptotically stable set of the replicator
dynamics. Since the domain  is polyhedral, A is included
in a face FA of . The support of the face S(FA) is
the set of subscripts (n;i) such that there exists q 2 A
with qn;i 6= 0 or 1. The relative interior of the face is
Int(FA) = fq 2 F(A)s:t:8(n;i) 2 S(FA);0 < qn;i < 1g.
Furthermore, it should be clear that faces are invariant
under the replicator dynamics. Hence on the face FA, by
using the transformation vn;i
def = log(
qn;i
qn;in
);8q 2 Int(FA),
one can see that
@
@vn;i
dvn;i
dt
= 0;8n 2 N;i 2 I:
Up to this transformation, the divergence of the vector
ﬁeld is null on FA. Using Liouville’s theorem [7], we infer
that the transformed dynamics preserves volume in Int(FA).
The only possibility to preserve volume in the set Int(FA)
containing an asymptotically stable set is that all points in
Int(FA) are equilibrium points. By continuity of the vector
ﬁeld, all the points in face FA are equilibria. Finally, since
A is asymptotically stable, this means that A = FA.
We say that s = (sn)n2N is a pure Nash Equilib-
rium if 8n 2 N, 8s0
n 6= sn;Un(s1 :::sn :::sjNj) 
Un(s1 :::s0
n :::sjNj).
Remark 2: Let q be a pure strategy. We denote by in the
choice of player n such that qn;in = 1. Then, q is a pure
Nash equilibrium is equivalent to:
8n 2 N;8j 6= in;fin;n(q)  fj;n(q):
Proposition 3: All asymptotically stable points of the
replicator dynamics are pure Nash equilibria.
Proof: Let ^ q be an asymptotically stable point. Then ^ q is
a face of  by Proposition 2 (i.e. a 0-1 point), with, say
^ qn;i = 1. Assume that ^ q is not a Nash equilibrium. Then,
there exists j 6= i such that fj;n(^ q)  fi;n(^ q). Now, consider
a point q0 = ^ q +en;j  en;i. Notice that fn;i(q0) = fn;i(^ q)
since q0 and ^ q only differ on components concerning user n.
Then starting in q0, the replicator dynamics is
dqn;i
dt (q0)=q0
n;i(fn;i(q0)   ((1   )fn;j(q0) + fn;i(q0))
=(1   )(fn;i(^ q)   ((1   )fn;j(^ q) + fn;i(^ q))
= (1   )(fn;j(^ q)   fn;i(^ q))
0;
and
dqn;j
dt
(q0) =  
dqn;i
dt
(q0)  0:
For all users m 6= n, 8u 2 Im;q0
m;u 2 f0;1g, then
dqm;k
dt
(q0) = q0
m;k
 
fn;k(q0)  
X
u
q0
m;u(fn;u(q0))
!
= 0:
Therefore starting from q0, the dynamics keeps moving in
the direction en;j en;i (or stays still) and does not converge
to ^ q. This contradicts the fact that ^ q is asymptotically stable.
Proposition 4: Allocation games with repercussion utili-
ties admit at least one pure Nash equilibrium.
Proof: Allocation games with repercussion utilities admit
a potential that is a Lyapunov function of their replicator
dynamics. Since the domain  is compact, the Lyapunov
function reaches its maximal value inside . The argmax of
the Lyapunov function form an asymptotically stable sets A
of equilibrium points. By Proposition 2, these sets are faces
of the domain (hence contain pure points). All points in A
are Nash equilibrium points by using a similar argument as
in Proposition 3. This concludes the proof.
B. A Stochastic Approximation of the Replicator Dynamics.
In this section, we present an algorithmic construction of
the players’ strategies that select a pure Nash equilibrium
for the game with repercussion utilities. A similar learning
mechanism is proposed in [12]. We now assume a discrete
time, in which at each epoch t, players take random decision
sn(t) according to their strategy qn(t), and update their
strategy proﬁle according to their current payoff. We look
at the following algorithm (8n 2 N;i 2 In):
qn;i(t + 1) = qn;i(t) + rn(`sn(s))(1sn=i   qn;i(t)); (5)
where sn = sn(t),  > 0 is the constant step size of the
algorithm, and 1sn=i is equal to 1 if sn = i, and 0 otherwise.
Note that if  is small enough, then qn;i remains in the
interval [0;1]. Strategies are initialized with value q(0) = q0.
The step-size is chosen to be constant in order to have higher
convergence speed than with decreasing step size.
One can notice that this algorithm is fully distributed,
since for each player n, the only information needed is
rn(`sn(s)). Furthermore, at every iteration, each player only
need the utility on one action (which is randomly chosen).
In applicative context, this means that a player does not have
to scan all the action before update her strategy, what would
be costly.
Below, we provide some intuition on why the algorithm is
characterized by a differential equation, and how it asymp-
totically follows the replicator dynamics (4). Note that we
can re-write (5) as:
qn;i(t + 1) = qn;i(t) + b(qn;i(t);sn(t)):
Then, we can split b into its expected and martingale com-
ponents:
b(qn;i(t))=E[b(qn;i(t);sn(t))]
(t) =b(qn;i(t);sn(t))   b(qn;i(t)):Again, (5) can be re-written as:
qn;i(t + 1)   qn;i(t)

= b(qn;i(t)) + (t):
As (t) is a random difference between the update and its
expectation, then by application of a law of large numbers,
for small , this difference goes to zero. Hence, the trajectory
of qn;i(t) in discrete time converges to the trajectory in
continuous time of the differential equation:
8
<
:
dqn;i
dt
= b(qn;i); and
q(0) = q0:
Let us compute b(qn;i) (for ease of notations, we omit the
dependence on time t):
b(qn;i) = E[b(qn;i;sn)]
= qn;i(1   qn;i)fn;i(q)  
X
j6=i
qn;jqn;ifn;j(q)
= qn;i(fn;i(q)  
X
j
qn;jfn;j(q))
= qn;i(fn;i(q)   f(q)):
Then, qn;i(t) follows the replicator dynamics.
C. Properties of the algorithm.
The algorithm is designed so as to follow the well-known
replicator dynamics. Furthermore, the stochastic aspect
of the algorithm provides some stability to the solution:
whereas the deterministic solution of a replicator dynamics
may converge to a saddle point, this cannot happen with
the stochastic algorithm. The use of repercussion utilities
provides a potential to the companion game and it is
known that the potential is a Lyapunov function for the
replicator dynamics, hence the potential is increasing along
the trajectories. The following theorem aggregates the main
results about the algorithm applied on repercussion utilities.
Theorem 2: The algorithm (5) converges to a pure point
which is locally optimal for the potential function, and a
Nash equilibrium of the allocation game with repercussion
utilities.
Proof: The algorithm is a stochastic algorithm with constant
step size. From Theorem 8.5.1 of Kushner and Yin [13], we
infer that the algorithm asymptotically weakly converges as
 ! 0 to the solution of an ode, which is in our case the
replicator dynamics (4) (it is a particular case of the theorem
in which conditions of the theorem hold: all variables are in
a compact set and the dynamics is continuous). Furthermore,
since the replicator dynamics admits a Lyapunov function,
that is increasing along the trajectories, then the set to which
the sequence q(t) converges is an asymptotically stable set
of the replicator dynamics. From Proposition 2, the only
asymptotically stable sets of the dynamics are faces which
are sets of stationary points. Hence the algorithm converges
to faces which are asymptotically stable. Let q(t) be a
trajectory of the algorithm. Suppose that it converges to a
closed set A  FA, where FA is an asymptotically stable
face of the domain  (hence the vector ﬁeld is null on FA).
We further assume that A does not contain any pure point.
Let ^ q(0) 2 A. Then, the trajectory ^ q(t) following the
algorithm stays in FA. Furthermore, ^ q(t) converges almost
surely to a pure point. Indeed:
E[^ qn;i(t + 1)j^ q(t)]
= ^ qn;i(t)(^ qn;i(t) + fn;i(^ q(t))(1   ^ qn;i(t)))
+
X
j6=i
^ qn;j(^ qn;i(t)   fn;j(^ q(t))^ qn;i(t))
= ^ qn;i(t) + qn;i(fn;i(^ q(t))   fn(^ q(t))):
Since at a mixed stationary point fn;i(^ q) = fn(^ q), then:
E[^ qn(t + 1)j^ q(t)] = ^ qn(t):
Hence the process (^ qn(t))t is a martingale, and is almost
surely convergent. The process converges necessarily to
a ﬁxed point of the iteration ^ qn;i(t + 1) = ^ qn;i(t) +
rn(`sn(s))(1sn=i   ^ qn;i(t)), and the sole ﬁxed points are
pure points (since the step size  is constant).
We now show that if q(t) and ^ q(t) are deﬁned on the
same probability space and are coupled (driven by the same
sequence !) and if the distance d(q(0); ^ q(0)) is smaller than
, then, with a probability p that goes to 1 when  goes to
0, q(t) goes away from A, which is a contradiction.
First, we denote by Q the pure point attained by ^ q(t)
under !. We can separate Q from A since they are two
closed sets: in particular, for  sufﬁciently small, there exists
a ﬁnite time T such that the distance d(^ q(T);A) > . Let
us deﬁne dt = d(q(t); ^ q(t)). Then, one can check that, under
!, dt+1  dt(1 + r), where r
def = maxn maxs jrn(`sn(s))j,
with probability at least p(dt)
def = 1   dt
PN
n=1 In. Indeed
the vector of actions s(q) is the same as s(^ q) as long as
! picks the same choice for all players. This happens with
probability
1  
N X
n=1
In X
i=1
j
i X
k=1
qn;k(t)   ^ qn;k(t)j:
See Figure 1 for an illustration of this.
q1 q1 + q2 + q3 q1 + q2
^ q1 ^ q1 + ^ q2 ^ q1 + ^ q2 + ^ q3
0 1
Fig. 1. The thick line shows the measure of the set of all ! corresponding
to the same choices for player 1 (with 3 choices).
The lower bound follows from the inequality
j
Pi
k=1 qn;k(t)   ^ qn;k(t)j < dt.
Then, dT  (1 + r)T with probability at least p = QT
t=0 p(dt). As  goes to zero, dT goes to 0, and p goes to
1. Hence, with a probability closed to 1, d(q(T);A) > .
This is a contradiction with the fact that q(t) converges to
A.Finally, the fact that it is a Nash equilibrium follows from
Proposition 3.
One can notice that the convergence of the algorithm to a
pure point relies on the fact that the step size  is constant.
If it were decreasing, like in Chapter 2 of [14], the algorithm
would converge to an equilibrium point in a stable face, that
need not be pure.
The combination of both algorithm (5) and repercussion
utilities provides an iterative method to select a pure alloca-
tion which is stable, and locally optimal. This can be called
selection algorithm.
IV. GLOBAL MAXIMUM VS LOCAL MAXIMUM FOR THE
SELECTION ALGORITHM.
In the previous section, we showed that the algorithm
converges to a local maximum of the potential function.
This induces that if there is only one local maximum,
the algorithm attains the global maximum. This arises for
instance if the potential function is concave. Without the
uniqueness of the local maximum, there is no guaranty of
convergence to the global maximum. Hence, assume there
are multiple local maxima (that are pure points), which is
common when the payoffs are random. Each of them is
an attractor for the replicator dynamics. In this section, we
investigate the following question: does the initial point of
the algorithm belongs to the basin of attraction of the global
maximum?
Since every player has no preference at the beginning
of the algorithm, we assume that initially, 8n 2 N;i 2
In;qn;i(0) = 1
jInj. In the following sub-section we show
that in the case of two players, both having two choices, q(0)
is in the basin of attraction of the global maximum. Then,
in Subsections IV-B and IV-C, we give counter examples to
show that the result does not extend to the general case of
more than two players or more than two strategies.
A. Case of two players and two choices
Proposition 5: In a two players, two actions allocation
game with repercussion utilities, the initial point of the
algorithm is in the basin of attraction of the global maximum.
Proof: Both players 1 and 2 can either take action a or b.
We denote by x the probability for player 1 to choose a, and
by y the probability for 2 to choose a. We denote by K =
(ki;j)i;j2f0;1g the matrix such that ki;j
def = F(x = i;y = j),
where F(x;y) is the potential function. Then, the dynamics
(4) can be rewritten:
8
> <
> :
dx
dt
= x(1   x)(k0;1   k0;0 + Ky)
dy
dt
= y(1   y)(k1;0   k0;0 + Kx);
(6)
where K = k1;1 + k0;0   k0;1   k1;0. Note that in a two-
player two-action game, there are at most two local maxima.
Suppose that in the considered game, there are two local
maxima. They are necessarily attained either at points (0;0)
and (1;1) or at points (0;1) and (1;0). Without loss of
generality, we can assume the former case. Hence, k0;0 and
k1;1 are local maxima, and k1;1 > k0;0 + , where  > 0.
We now deﬁne set E and function V as follows:
V (x;y) = j1   xj + j1   yj;
E = f(x;y) : x + y > 1; 0 < x; y < 1g:
(V is actually the distance of (x;y) to the point (1;1) for
the 1-norm.) We next show that V is a Lyapunov function
for the dynamics on the open set E. Toward that goal, it is
sufﬁcient to show that
L(x;y)
def =
@V
@x
(x;y)
dx
dt
+
@V
@y
(x;y)
dy
dt
< 0:
First, note that 8(x;y) 2 E, V (x;y) = 2 x y. Hence,
from Eq. 6,
L(x;y) =  x(1   x)(k0;1   k0;0 + Ky)
  y(1   y)(k1;0   k0;0 + Kx): (7)
Let also be D the open segment f(x;y) : x + y = 1;0 <
x;y < 1g. Trivially,
8(x;y) 2 D;
L(x;y = 1   x) =  x(1   x)(k1;1   k0;0) < 0: (8)
Let us ﬁnally consider the segment
S(x0) = f(x;y) : x + y  1;x = x0;0  y  1g:
Figure 2 summarizes the different notations introduced.
S(1
2)
D
(@V
@x; @V
@y)
E
Fig. 2. Proof of Prop. 5: Summary of notations
Since E 
[
0<x<1
S(x), it is sufﬁcient to show the
negativeness of L on S(x) for all x. Let us denote by
Lx(y) the restriction of L on S(x). From Eq. 8, we have
Lx(1   x) < 0. Furthermore, Lx(y) is a quadratic function
and its discriminant is 4(k1;0   k0;0)(k1;1   k0;1), hence is
negative. So, for all x, Lx(y) is negative (strictly). Finally,
L is negative (strictly) in E and hence non-positive in a
neighborhood of E.
Therefore, V is a Lyapunov function for the dynamics on a
neighborhood of the open set E. More precisely, V is strictly
decreasing on the trajectories of the dynamics starting in the
set E, hence they converge to the unique minimum of V
which is the point (1;1). This applies to the initial point
(0:5;0:5).
Figure 3 illustrates this result: consider a two player
(numbered 1 and 2), two strategy (denoted by A and B)game. Let x (resp. y) be the probability for player 1 (resp.
2) to take action A. While two (local) maxima exist -
namely (1;1) and (0;0) - the surface covered by the basin
of attraction of the global optimum (which is (1;1) in this
example) is greater than those of the other one. A by-product
is that the dynamics starting in point (0:5;0:5) converges to
the global optimum.
 0
 0.5
 1
 0  0.5  1 x
y
Fig. 3. An example with 2 players with 2 choices each. There are
2 maxima. The point ( 1
2; 1
2) is inside the attracting basin of the global
maximum.
Unfortunately, this appealing result cannot be generalized
to more players or more actions, as exempliﬁed in the
following subsections.
B. Extension to more than two players
Example 2: Let us consider a three player game :
(N;I;U) with N = f1;2;3g, I = fA;Bg, and U =
(un(i;j;k))n2f1;2;3g;i;j;k2fA;Bg, where i (resp. j), denotes
the choice of player 1 (resp. 2). The matrix representation
of (u1;u2;u3) are given below:
(u1;u2;u3)(i;j;1) =

(9;6;4) (5;5;5)
(5;8;1) (2;4;4)

;
(u1;u2;u3)(i;j;2) =

(7;2;8) (5;4;7)
(6;3;3) (10;2;8)

:
Note that this game has no pure strategies Nash equilibrium
and a single mixed strategies Nash equilibrium, which is
(x;y;z) = (1=3;5=6;0). The corresponding value of the
potential function is 87=6 = 14:5.
The repercussion utility matrices are:
(r1;r2;r3)(i;j;1) =

(10;9;10) (6;5;5)
(5;5;6) (1;1;4)

;
(r1;r2;r3)(i;j;2) =

(6;4;8) (5;3;7)
(1;3;4) (9;11;14)

:
This game has two pure Nash equilibria, that are (x;y;z) =
(1;1;1) and (x;y;z) = (0;0;0), corresponding to values of
the potential function that are respectively 29 and 34.
Figure 4 shows that the trajectory starting at point (1
2; 1
2; 1
2)
converges to the local maximum (x;y;z) = (1;1;1) instead
of the global maximum (x;y;z) = (0;0;0). Note that the
performance of the local maximum is way ahead that of the
Nash Equilibrium in the original game.
 0
 0.5
 1 0
 0.5
 1
 0
 0.5
 1
z
y
x
Fig. 4. Example with 3 players, with 2 choices each. The ﬁgure represents
the dynamic trajectory starting from the point (x;y;z)(0) = ( 1
2; 1
2; 1
2),
with x (resp. y, z) the probability for player 1 (resp. 2, 3) to adopt action A.
The dynamics converges to the point (1;1;1) whereas the global maximum
is (0;0;0).
C. Extension to more than two choices
Example 3: Let us now consider the two player game
(N;I;U) with N = f1;2g, I = fA;B;Cg, U =
(un(i;j))n2f1;2g;i2fA;Bg;j2fA;B;Cg. (Note that in this exam-
ple, only the second player has three possible choices).
The payoff matrix is:
(u1;u2)(i;j) =

(6;3) ( 3;11) ( 3;10)
(0;2) ( 1;1) (0;10)

:
The companion game is:
(r1;r2)(i;j) =

(7;12) ( 3;11) ( 3;10)
(0;2) ( 11;0) (0;10)

:
The original game has one single pure Nash equilibria
which is (B;C) resulting in the value 10 for the potential
function and no mixed strategies equilibria exists.
The companion game has two pure Nash equilibria that are
(A;A) and (B;C), corresponding to values of the potential
function of 9 and 10 respectively.
Denote x the probability for player 1 to choose action A
and y1 (resp. y2) the probability for player 2 to choose action
A (resp. B). Then, the global maximum of the potential
function is 10, and is attained when x = y1 = y2 = 0.
Figure 5 shows that the trajectory starting at point (1
2; 1
3; 1
3)
converges to the local maximum (1;1;0), corresponding to
Nash equilibrium (A;A) of the companion game, which is
inefﬁcient. Interestingly in this example, the unique Nash
equilibrium of the original game corresponds to the global
maximum of the game. 0
 0.5
 1 0  0.33
 0.67
 1
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
y2
x
y1
Fig. 5. Example with 2 players. The ﬁrst one has 2 choices and the second
one has 3 choices. Here we display the 3-dimensional plot of y1 vs x and
y2 vs x. The dynamics starting in (1=2;1=3;1=3) converges to the point
(1;1;0) whereas the global maximum is (0;0;0).
V. CONCLUSION
This paper presents a distributed stochastic algorithm that
selects efﬁcient pure allocations in game by introducing
the concept of repercussion utilities. The construction of
repercussion utilities insures that the game becomes a po-
tential game and the algorithm is an approximation of the
replicator dynamics for this game. The trajectories are shown
to converge to pure allocations that are Nash equilibria for
the later game and locally socially optimal for the original
payoffs.
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